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Abstract
Decision transparency is often proposed as a way to maintain or even increase citizen trust, yet this assumption is still untested
in the context of regulatory agencies. We test the effect of transparency of a typical decision tradeoff in regulatory enforcement:
granting forbearance or imposing a sanction. We employed a representative survey experiment (n = 1,546) in which we test the
effect of transparency in general (providing information about a decision or not) and the effect of speciﬁc types of transparency
(process or rationale transparency). We do this for agencies supervising ﬁnancial markets, education, and health care. We ﬁnd
that overall decision transparency signiﬁcantly increases citizen trust in only two of the three agencies. Rationale transparency
has a more pronounced positive effect only for the Education Inspectorate. We conclude that the overall effect of decision trans-
parency is positive but that the nature of the regulatory domain may weaken or strengthen this effect.
Keywords: citizen trust, decision acceptance, enforcement, openness, regulatory agencies.
1. Introduction
Given the rise of the number of regulatory agencies and their increasing powers (Majone 1997; Levi-Faur & Jordana
2005), it is imperative that they are being perceived as trustworthy by the public. So far, most research has been con-
cerned with stakeholder trust and regulatory relations (Six & Verhoest 2016), yet also citizen trust is crucial for the
effectiveness of regulatory agencies. For instance, trust in regulatory agencies is needed for the uptake of their recom-
mendations by citizens and, as a result, regulated entities may feel more pressure to be compliant (Walls et al. 2004).
Hence, citizen trust in regulatory agencies is crucial to sustain the effectiveness of regulatory agencies that, to a large
extent, depend on voluntary compliance by regulated entities (Murphy et al. 2009; Murphy 2016).
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Transparency of decisionmaking – showing how and why a decision was taken – has been widely lauded as a
way to sustain or even increase such trustworthiness (Hood & Heald 2006). The core idea behind this is that if
governments are more open about how and why they make decisions, citizens will better understand the com-
plexities and dilemmas, and eventually come to trust them more (Meijer 2009). However, recent empirical studies
have shown that such broad assumptions about transparency are naïve and that the effect of transparency is
highly context-dependent (De Fine Licht et al. 2014; Cucciniello et al. 2017). Literature on regulatory agencies,
however, has paid limited attention to the effects of decision transparency. Although there have been studies
focusing on effects of so-called targeted transparency on stakeholder compliance (e.g. Fung et al. 2007; van Erp
2011), transparency concerning their own decisions affecting citizen trust has been largely neglected in the litera-
ture (de Vries 2016; Six & Verhoest 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2018).
The dearth of studies in this area is surprising as regulatory decisions, and especially enforcement decisions,
are highly interesting to citizens. Enforcement decisions of regulatory agencies directly or indirectly affect citizens’
lives. For instance, a decision to close a nursery home or school has a great direct impact on pupils, parents,
elderly, and caretakers. Indirectly citizens are impacted by news media who often report on incidents and
remarkable enforcement decisions, sometimes causing reactions from the public or political stir (e.g. Gilad et al.
2013; van Erp 2013).
Transparency of particularly enforcement decisions is interesting for another reason, as such decisions are
wrought with tradeoffs. For instance, in many enforcement decisions, regulators face a tradeoff between “going
by the book” or being accommodating, for instance, by taking an educational approach to violators (Braithwaite
et al. 1987; Bardach & Kagan 2002; Lo et al. 2009; McAllister 2010). In light of these common tradeoffs in
enforcement decisions that regulatory agencies have to make, we test whether providing people with information
about such decisions affects trust.
We argue that decision transparency could affect trust mainly through two psychological mechanisms. First,
exposing citizens to details of a decision is expected to decrease the psychological distance between a citizen and regu-
latory agency. Based on construal level theory of psychological distance (Liberman & Trope 1998; Trope & Liberman
2010), we expect that providing information about a regulatory agency decision decreases the psychological distance.
This causes citizens to assess trust not just based on abstract and perhaps negative stereotypes (e.g. Marvel 2015), but
on detailed and concrete perceptions about what regulatory agencies actually do, which may eventually increase trust
(e.g. Benedicktus 2008; Edwards et al. 2009). Second, based on the theory of motivated scepticism (Taber & Lodge
2006), we expect that a speciﬁc form of transparency – rationale transparency – may be better suited to improve citi-
zen trust compared with other forms of transparency (De Fine Licht et al. 2014). Motivated scepticism postulates that
if people are presented with a conclusion they oppose, they inhibit a strong motivation to scrutinize information and
arguments underlying that conclusion (Ditto & Lopez 1992; Taber & Lodge 2006). Providing a clear rationale there-
fore may help to justify a difﬁcult decision and overcome initial scepticism of citizens.
Overall, this article explores different ways to inform citizens about regulatory, and more speciﬁcally, enforce-
ment decisions and their effects on their trust. The research question guiding this article is: Does decision trans-
parency inﬂuence citizen trust in regulatory agencies?
In this article, we employ a survey experiment in a sample representative of the Dutch population of 18 years
and older (n = 1,546) to investigate this question. The experiment employs a 3 × 5 factorial between-subjects
design. The ﬁrst factor is the type of agency which consists of three agencies: the Dutch Authority for the Finan-
cial Markets (AFM), the Dutch Health Care Inspectorate, and the Dutch Inspectorate of Education. The second
factor consists of ﬁve groups: a nontransparency group that received only general information about the agency
(control), a basic decisionmaking transparency group that received information about a decision only, and three
variations of more elaborate decisionmaking transparency, who received more information about how (process)
and/or why (rationale) a decision was made.
Overall, we ﬁnd that exposing citizens to decision transparency signiﬁcantly increases citizen trust in the Edu-
cation and Health Inspectorate, but not the Authority Financial Markets, compared to control groups that
received general information about these agencies. Furthermore, we ﬁnd a more pronounced positive effect of
speciﬁcally rationale transparency compared to other forms of transparency only for the Education Inspectorate.
Hence, the speciﬁc effect of decision transparency appears to depend on the nature of the regulatory domain. We
explore possible implications and interpretations in the Discussion section.
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2. Deﬁning trust in regulatory agencies
Trust has been studied widely across all social science disciplines and this has resulted in a great variety of deﬁni-
tions (Rousseau et al. 1998; Dietz 2011). In this article, we do not aim nor claim to provide a comprehensive dis-
cussion of the literature on trust. Instead, we use the limited space available here to explain how we deﬁned trust
in the context of citizen trust of regulatory agencies. We employ a broad and much-cited deﬁnition of trust by
Mayer et al. (1995) and then explain how this ﬁts with our focus on citizen trust in regulatory agencies. Mayer
et al. deﬁne trust as follows: “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on
the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to
monitor or control that other party” (Mayer et al. 1995, p. 712).
We will discuss two crucial elements of this deﬁnition in more detail: “vulnerability” and “expectations” of the
trusted party. First, vulnerability is inherent to the relation between citizens and regulatory agencies (Six 2013). For
instance, citizens cannot assess the quality of nursing homes, schools, or ﬁnancial institutions by themselves. So,
when a person needs to move to a nursing home, or puts their children in a school, this person assumes – or hopes –
that the regulatory agencies have done their job sufﬁciently and that he or she can be assured of a certain minimum
level of safety and quality of a nursing home or school. If an agency has not carried out the tasks it has been entrusted
with, this person risks choosing a low quality – or even unsafe – nursing home. Hence, a relationship that entails citi-
zen trust in a regulatory agency involves an element of vulnerability.
Second, central to trust are the expectations of the vulnerable party (i.e. the citizen). These expectations are based
on the perceptions that people have of the “other.” In other words: are the intentions and behaviors of the other per-
ceived to be trustworthy? In this article, we conceptualized “trust in regulatory agencies” as the extent to which citi-
zens consider these agencies “worthy of trust.” Various literature reviews have shown that we best conceptualize
perceived trustworthiness in multiple dimensions. Three dimensions are central: perceived competence, benevolence,
and integrity (Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 2002; McEvily & Tortoriello 2011; Six & Verhoest 2016;
Grimmelikhuijsen & Knies 2017). Perceived competence is the extent to which a citizen perceives the regulatory
agency to be capable, effective, skillful, and professional; perceived benevolence refers to the extent to which a citizen
perceives the regulatory agency to care about the welfare of the public and to be motivated to act in the public inter-
est; perceived integrity is whether citizen perceives the regulatory agency to be sincere, truthful, and to fulﬁll its
promises.
The role of trust between stakeholders and regulatory agencies has been researched widely (e.g. Braithwaite &
Makkai 1994; van Erp 2010; Six 2013), however, a recent literature review on regulatory trust found that publi-
shed empirical studies on citizen trust in regulatory agencies are relatively scarce and deserves more attention
(Six & Verhoest 2016). Nevertheless, some studies provide important insights. For instance, Walls et al. (2004)
employ focus groups and ﬁnd that citizens are relatively unknowing of what regulatory agencies do exactly, but
that they are able to take a “reasoned view” on what they think an agency should do to promote the public inter-
est. Providing decision transparency may help citizens to develop such a reasoned view of regulatory agencies.
Other empirical studies have focused on the relation between communication of regulatory agencies and citi-
zen trust. For instance, some have looked at citizen trust in regulatory agencies and focus on risk communication
after impactful incidents (e.g. Chou & Liou 2010), or communication on the risk of using new technologies, such
as nanotechnology (e.g. Sylvester et al. 2009). Despite their limited number, these studies show that regulators are
poised to look for ways to responsibly communicate with the public about risks in the domain that they regulate.
More recently, however, transparency of the regulatory agencies themselves has come to the limelight, which we
will discuss in more detail in the next section.
3. Regulatory transparency and decisionmaking
The problem with using a popular term such as transparency is that it also obscures a lot of things: it can mean
many things to many people. Therefore, it is crucial to be precise in deﬁning and describing transparency. A sys-
tematic literature review of 187 studies on transparency by Cucciniello et al. (2017) reveals that most deﬁnitions
address the availability of information of decisionmaking processes, budgets, operations, or performance of
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governmental bodies. Releasing such information should enable inward observability, to allow external stake-
holders to monitor the internal operations of an organization.1
This leaves open whether the disclosed information concerns the organization itself or a different body (orga-
nization A discloses information about organization B). This is particularly relevant to regulatory agencies as they
increasingly tend to disclose information about other entities. In other words, regulators often use so-called
“targeted transparency” as a tool to enforce compliance among the organizations they regulate (Fung et al. 2007;
van Erp 2011). The Health Care Inspectorate in the Netherlands, for instance, publishes inspection reports about
quality and safety of health care and the Dutch Inspectorate of Education does the same concerning educational
quality of schools (e.g. Meijer 2007). The effectiveness of publishing such reports on compliance and performance
has been subject to much debate (Etzioni 2010). For instance, the effectiveness of “naming and shaming” of non-
compliant regulatees has been contested, and depends on a number of different aspects, such as the responsive-
ness and type of supervised entity and the nature of the violated norm (van Erp 2010, 2011).
The disclosure practices of regulatory agencies targeting other organizations have also brought another aspect of
transparency to the fore: namely, the transparency of regulatory agencies about themselves. Like other (semi)govern-
mental bodies, regulatory agencies have come under some pressure to disclose information about their methods, pro-
cedures, and decisions with the idea of fostering accountability and trust (e.g. Porumbescu 2015; de Vries 2016; de
Boer et al. 2018). The basic premise is that transparency fosters knowledge and understanding about what govern-
ment does and that this knowledge and understanding eventually brings greater trust (Hood & Heald 2006).
More recent notions and studies of transparency have shown such broad assertions about transparency are
naïve. Various experimental studies on the effects of transparency have yielded mixed results at best
(Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2017). For instance, two experimental studies, which looked at the relationship between
transparency and legitimacy, found a negative relationship between transparency and legitimacy, especially when
the topic that is being made transparent is a contested one (De Fine Licht 2011, 2014; De Fine Licht et al. 2014).
Only a few experimental studies ﬁnd a positive effect of transparency on citizen trust (e.g. Porumbescu &
Grimmelikhuijsen 2018). Overall, the conclusion of this emerging body of empirical research is that the effects of
transparency are highly context-bound and that more investigation is needed to uncover how the relation
between transparency and trust holds in various contexts.
But what speciﬁcally does decisionmaking transparency of regulatory agencies look like? Our deﬁnition of
transparency regards releasing information about organizational matters to allow external stakeholders to moni-
tor that organization. Decision transparency, then, is releasing information about why and how a decision was
made by an agency. A commonly used way to further conceptualize decision transparency is in decision rationale
(why) and in decision process (how). This distinction has been ﬁrst applied to transparency by De Fine Licht
et al. (2014), who based this distinction on work by Mansbridge (2009). Transparency in rationale concerns the
information on the substance of the decision, such as the facts and reasons on which it was based. This is typi-
cally information that is targeted toward an audience that has not been involved in a decisionmaking procedure
directly. For example, a decision to grant forbearance to a lender that was not compliant with current regulations.
Transparency of a decision rationale, then, would provide clear reasons to the public for why the ﬁnancial regula-
tor decided the way it did, and on which facts these reasons were grounded.
In contrast, process transparency refers to things that happened during the decisionmaking process, such as
deliberations, negotiations, and procedures. This information can be disclosed ex-ante, real-time, or in retrospect.
Ex-ante transparency can be fostered by providing information about how regulatory agencies will come to a
sanctioning decision by outlining the steps, regulations and procedures that are going to be used. So far, real-time
transparency initiatives in the context of regulatory agencies are still limited in number, although the Food Safety
Agency (UK) does publish live videos of their committee meetings.2 An example of process transparency in retro-
spect is the publishing of minutes of such a committee meeting, or by explaining the negotiations and procedures
that have been applied when coming to a decision.
The distinction between rationale and process transparency is important for trust-related outcomes as well.
We know from various experiments that appealing to procedural elements in decisionmaking affects trust.
Porumbescu and Grimmelikhuijsen (2018) show that exposing people to information about a decisionmaking
procedure (process transparency) increases their trust in local government. On the other hand, De Fine Licht
et al. (2014) found opposite effects of exposing citizens to a decisionmaking procedure. They manipulated
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rationale and process transparency in a vignette experiment in a school setting. Participants were presented with
a vignette in which new rules of conduct would be adopted by the school. In the rationale transparency condition,
the reasons for the new rules were explained, while in the process transparency condition participants gained
insights into deliberations during the decisionmaking process. De Fine Licht et al. conclude that rationale trans-
parency – i.e. justifying the choices behind a decision – increases decision acceptance, whereas process transpar-
ency does not. Overall, these ﬁndings seem to suggest that especially getting a direct insight into the reasons
(rationale) behind a decision helps to increase trust, yet it does not provide a theoretical explanation for the
mechanisms at the level of the individual citizen exposed to such information. In the next section, we will elabo-
rate on two psychological mechanisms that connect transparency and trust at this microlevel.
4. Connecting transparency and trust: Two psychological mechanisms
First, we expect decisionmaking transparency to change the criteria by which citizens judge regulatory agencies.
Based on construal level theory of the psychological distance, we expect that providing information about a regu-
latory decision decreases the psychological distance between the participant and the object that is evaluated,
which leads to evaluations that are focused on more detailed as opposed to global aspects of the evaluated object
(Liberman & Trope 1998; Trope & Liberman 2010). Four key dimensions have been found to affect psychological
distance: geographical distance; temporal distance; distance between the perceiver and a social target, that is,
another individual or group; and uncertainty (how certain it is that an event will happen) (Trope et al. 2007).
Most central to this study is the dimension of social distance.
Social distance is increased by dissimilarities with the other object, but also by higher perceived power by the
other (Smith & Trope 2006). Increased social distance has profound effects on the way an object is evaluated. For
instance, when social distance to another person increases from an in-group member (close social distance) to an
out-group member (far social distance), people will mentally construe the other person using abstract concepts
such as stereotypes (Kim et al. 2008). One’s overall evaluation of this person will become more strongly affected
by these stereotypes (Idson & Mischel 2001).
The degree of social distance has been found to affect judgements of organizations, too. Research in consumer
behavior has shown that there is a link between higher distance and lower trust in (commercial) organizations,
too (Benedicktus 2008; Edwards et al. 2009). In line with this, we argue that providing transparency about a regu-
latory agency decreases the social distance between a citizen and the agency. Without decision transparency, a cit-
izen relies on broad categorizations and stereotypes of the agency. Such stereotypes might relate to government
and the public sector in general and these bring out negative images of government waste and inefﬁciency
(Marvel 2015). When some level of decision transparency is provided, we expect citizens to move from a high
level of abstraction to a low level of abstraction. This means that, when evaluating a regulatory agency, a citizen
is more likely to focus on speciﬁc aspects of how it makes decisions instead of relying on broad stereotypes.
Therefore, we postulate the Transparency Hypothesis, which states that providing decision transparency – in
general – decreases the distance between citizens and regulatory agencies, which positively relates to trust
in them:
Transparency Hypothesis: Providing decision information will lead to more citizen trust in a regulatory agency,
compared to a control group with only general information about the agency.
Second, based on an experiment by De Fine Licht et al. (2014), we expect rationale transparency to have a
more positive effect than other types of transparency. We assume that an additional psychological mechanism
might be at play when tradeoffs are being disclosed to the public. Based on the theory of motivated scepticism,
we argue that if people are presented with information they are potentially sceptical about, such as a decision tra-
deoff, they are more strongly motivated to scrutinize information and arguments that support that conclusion
(Ditto & Lopez 1992; Taber & Lodge 2006).
Providing information that explicitly justiﬁes a decision, such as a decision rationale, may meet this higher
level of information scrutiny. Therefore, we expect rationale transparency to have a more profoundly positive
effect on trust than process transparency. Transparency of a decision-process – i.e. gleaning insight into how the
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decision was made – might not necessarily provide a justiﬁcation for the decision and thus have a less pro-
nounced effect on trust (e.g. De Fine Licht 2014; De Fine Licht et al. 2014). We propose the following:
Rationale Transparency Hypothesis: Providing decision information explaining the rationale behind a decision
will lead to more citizen trust in a regulatory agency, compared to providing other types of decision transparency.
We test each hypothesis in three regulatory domains: ﬁnance, education, and health care. The main reason
for taking three different regulatory domains into consideration is to assess if the effects of transparency and
rationale transparency are robust and generalizable across domains. Speciﬁcally, these three domains are chosen
because of their relatively high visibility to the public. At the same time, we acknowledge that there are large dif-
ferences in the characteristics of these regulatory regimes in terms of their organizational structure, governance,
procedures, functioning, regulatory duties, and accountability arrangements (May 2007). Although there
undoubtedly are differences in the overall level of transparency and trust in regulatory agencies in these domains,
we have found no theory to support a priori expectations about whether citizens actually respond differently to
decision transparency provided across these domains. Nonetheless, we will carry out additional analyses to inves-
tigate if any differences between the domains exist.
5. Research design
5.1. Design, materials, and data
We designed a 3 (domain) × 5 (transparency type) factorial between-subjects vignette experiment to test the
robustness of our claims across three regulatory agencies: the Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM), the
Inspectorate of Education, and the Health Care Inspectorate. In this section, we explain the overall features of
these experiments. Figure 1 provides a graphical overview.
The data were collected by Blauw, one of the larger market research companies in the Netherlands. Respondents
were recruited by Blauw from a blend of large panels (N > 250,000) managed by Survey Sampling International
(SSI, now called Dynata). Although this was not a probability sample taken from the population, self-selection
effects are countered by the following measures. First, SSI randomly draws participants from a variety of panels
Figure 1 Experimental setup for the experiment. Shaded boxes refer to questions in the survey. Open boxes refer to texts
that were provided to read to all groups except the control groups (C). Text in the ﬁrst round (decision: 2nd chance) was sim-
ilar for all experimental groups. In the second round (decision: sanction), four groups were randomly made: D: only decision
(D), DP: decision (D) with process transparency (P), DR: decision (D) with rationale transparency (R), and DPR: decision
(D) with both process transparency (P) and rationale transparency (R).
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including more traditional research panels where respondents regularly participate in research, but also panels with
participants that have indicated to be willing to participate in research on a one-time basis. Second, self-selection
was countered by having invitations that contained no cues about the topic or duration of the survey. Instead, par-
ticipants clicked on a link to an online platform from SSI where they were randomly assigned to a survey.
A stratiﬁed sampling strategy was designed to select respondents in such a way that the sample is representa-
tive of the Dutch population based on gender, educational level, and age. A check afterward conﬁrmed this objec-
tive was achieved; our samples aligned fairly well with the overall gender, age, and education distribution for the
total adult Dutch population (see section “Sample” for details).
The total sample consisted of 1,546 respondents. The whole sample ﬁrst answered background questions and
also questions on trust in, and knowledge of, all three studied regulators. The items that measure pre-existing
knowledge, as well as the other items we mention here, will be discussed in the operationalization section. We
have included these measurements to assess on the one hand, to what degree the regulatory agencies are known
within our sample, and on the other hand to check if there is a relationship between being familiar with a regula-
tory agency and trusting a regulatory agency.
After the general questions, the three separate but comparable experiments for each regulator began, con-
sisting of about 500 participants randomly allocated per regulator. Stratiﬁed sampling based on age, gender, and
educational level was used to populate the three experiments to make sure that the experimental cells were repre-
sentative for the population of the Netherlands.
In each experiment, all respondents –including the control groups– got to read a short description introduc-
ing the goal of the relevant regulatory agency. We included this brief text to ensure that each respondent has at
least a basic understanding of the regulatory agency, regardless of their pre-existing knowledge.
Within each experiment, respondents were randomly assigned to one of ﬁve groups. One group was a control
group (C), receiving only general information about the agency. The four groups that did receive information, all
received the same information in the ﬁrst round. In each case, the regulatory agency encounters a regulatee,
which does not adhere to regulations. A tradeoff was then described: the regulatory agency’s has the choice
between imposing a sanction or giving the regulatee a chance to conform to the law within a certain period (for-
bearance). In the ﬁrst round, the decision was to offer a second chance after an offense, the opportunity to cor-
rect. The template for the information on the ﬁrst decision3:
Title: Regulatory agency gives [Regulatee X] a second chance
Lead: [Regulatee X] has been in sight of [regulatory agency] for a while because of [violation], however the regula-
tory agency has decided to give [Regulatee X] a second chance – and not to impose a sanction yet. This prevents
both employees and clients of [Regulatee X] from suffering negative effects of a potential default of [Regulatee X].
Body: [explanation of the violation – focus on negative impacts for clients]
Ending: However, the [regulatory agency] has decided to give [Regulatee X] a chance to improve. This prevents
the regulatee from having to deal with ﬁnancial problems, which could lead to [negative effects for clients and
employees].
After a period of one year, the [regulatory agency] will assess if the regulatee has sufﬁciently improved.
Subsequently, respondents were asked about their acceptance of this decision by the regulator to offer the
offending party a second chance.
In the second round of information, participants were randomly assigned to one of the following conditions:
• Decision only (D): A decision information group, receiving only a ﬁnal decision (D), without additional
explanation;
• Decision and Process (DP): A process transparency group, receiving an explanation of the process leading
up to the decision. This included elements of how the decision was made such as hearings;
• Decision and Rationale (DR): A rationale transparency group, receiving information concerning the ratio-
nale behind the decision. This included a statement of the main reason behind issuing a hefty sanction,
which is the case of the inspection protecting vulnerable customer, clients, or pupils;
• Decision, Process and Rationale (DPR): A rationale and process group, receiving both a rationale and pro-
cess explanation.
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The vignettes were designed to be as comparable as possible across the three domains (ﬁnance, education,
and health care). To enhance experimental realism, we asked senior inspectors from the Dutch AFM, the Health
Care Inspectorate, and the Dutch Inspectorate of Education to read and correct our vignettes to make them as
realistic as possible.
After reading the texts of the second round, all groups completed a measure of their trust in the relevant reg-
ulatory agency by answering an adapted version of the Citizen Trust in Government Organizations (CTGO) scale
developed by Grimmelikhuijsen and Knies (2017), which is discussed in the “Measures” section.
Next in the survey, relevant groups could again provide their decision agreement, this time the decision to
sanction. To conclude the questionnaire, we asked additional background questions, for instance if respondents
worked in either education, health care or the ﬁnancial sector.
5.2. Measures
We used and adapted the CTGO scale originally developed by Grimmelikhuijsen and Knies (2017). In contrast to
the original scale, a Principal Component Analysis revealed that there was only one underlying factor for our
nine trust items, with one component with an Eigenvalue of 6.27 and the second component of just 0.47. Looking
at the one factor solution, we ﬁnd that all items have high factor loadings (≥0.797) and together have a
Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.96, which indicates that they form a reliable construct. Therefore, we conduct our analysis
using the trust scale without distinguishing separate dimensions.
We also measured decision agreement at two points in the experiment: ﬁrst after the vignette describing the
decision to grant forbearance and secondly after the decision to penalize the supervised organization. We gauged
decision agreement with the follow question: I agree with the decision of the regulatory agency (1-Strongly
disagree–5-Strongly agree).
5.3. Sample
Tables below show a comparison between our sample data and actual descriptive statistics of the Dutch popula-
tion in the year 2016, as generated by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).
The ﬁrst row in Table 1 shows a match between the percentage of female participants in our sample and the
percentage in the overall population. In the educational level, we see a difference of about 7 percentage points
between the sample and population.
The second Table shows a 2-year deviation from our sample relative to the population. These discrepancies
are most likely caused by the fact that CBS uses a different minimum age: the educational level statistics (which
we used here) start being measured at 15 years old, whereas the minimum age for our sample is 18. This leads to
more people having ﬁnished their high school, leading to a higher average education and a higher average age. In
addition, lower educated participants are known to be less likely to participate in research. That being said, our
overall sample composition is a reasonable match with the population of the Netherlands.
5.4. Analysis
We carried out a two-way ANOVA analysis using R version 3.5.1 (R Core Team 2018) to investigate the main
effect of transparency and the regulatory domain. We ﬁrst determined the overall effects of transparency, regula-
tory domain and their interaction. Next, we estimated marginal means and plots using the “emmeans” package
(Lenth 2018) and we used “ggplot” to graph changes in decision agreement (Wickham 2016).
Table 1 Sample descriptive versus actual population descriptive
Sample Population (Netherlands)
% Female 50.5 50.5
Education
Low 25.0 31.8
Middle 47.2 39.3
High 27.7 29.9
Age 43.2 41.5
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To speciﬁcally test both our hypotheses, we use planned comparisons. These comparisons provide more infor-
mation as to where speciﬁc group differences can be found. To test the Transparency Hypothesis, we created a
contrast between the control group and all other treatment groups, since this hypothesis predicts that there will
be a difference when transparency – of any kind – is provided. For the Rationale Transparency Hypothesis we
created a contrast that compared the rationale transparency group with the other transparency groups (hence
excluding the control group, which is tested in the ﬁrst contrast). We did this because this hypothesis predicted
rationale transparency to have a stronger positive effect on trust compared with other forms of transparency.
6. Results
6.1. Descriptive results
Before the experiment began, we asked the respondents a few questions about their familiarity with the regulatory
agencies and we also assessed the extent of their general trust in these agencies prior to the experiment. Overall,
most participants had at least heard of the names of the regulators: 95.6 percent of respondents were familiar with
the Dutch Inspectorate of Education and 94.1 percent knew about the Dutch Health Care Inspectorate. The
Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) was the least known of the regulators (65.7 percent). However, familiar-
ity with a name does not necessarily mean that people know what a regulatory agency does. Overall, 27.8 percent
of respondents said they had a (reasonably) good idea of what the AFM does, 58.9 percent know (reasonably) well
what the Inspectorate of Education does and 54.0 percent know what the Health Care Inspectorate does. Overall,
the Inspectorate of Education and Health Care Inspectorate are somewhat more familiar than the AFM.
Second, we also asked about general levels of trust and perceived importance prior to the experimental treat-
ments. In general, a large majority, 81.2 percent of respondents, (fully) agrees that oversight in ﬁnancial markets
is important; 62.8 percent (fully) agrees with the statement “I trust that the AFM carries out its task well.” Com-
paratively, 84.7 percent think oversight in education is important, with 69.6 having trust in it. For the Health
Care Inspectorate the percentages are 86.4 and 68.8 percent. Overall, the percentages across agencies are fairly
similar and reveal the pattern that most of the respondents agree that oversight is important and that a fairly
large majority tends to entrust the regulators with this task.
6.2. Decision agreement
Although our main interest is in the effect of transparency on trust, we also assessed how decision agreement
changed for each individual. In other words, we assessed the decision at T1 (when the agency decides to postpone
the sanction) and the ﬁnal decision at T2 (imposing a sanction after forbearance of a year). We carried out a
repeated measures ANOVA and found that decision agreement signiﬁcantly increased from T1 to T2 (F(1, 1,233)
= 139.67, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.102). Figure 2 shows the differences for each regulatory agency. Interestingly,
although there was an overall change in decision agreement, this change was not signiﬁcant for the Education
Inspectorate.
In general, there is more acceptance of the decision to issue sanctions than to offer forbearance. The exception
to the case is the Inspectorate of Education in which there was already a high acceptance to postpone the sanc-
tion in the ﬁrst instance, and we do not ﬁnd a difference between the two decisions. A possible explanation for
this may be that the sanction in this part of the case study was a high ﬁne for school, decreasing their budget and
hurting the quality of education for pupils. The ﬁnancial regulator supervises commercial parties and these sup-
posedly receive less mercy from the public. Forbearance, or postponing a sanction may therefore be less accepted
as well. The Health Care Inspectorate falls somewhere in between these two. Overall, this supports the idea that –
in general – the public approves more of giving sanctions than offering a second chance.
6.3. Effect of transparency on trust
Table 2 shows indeed that there is an overall signiﬁcant effect of the transparency treatment in our data
(F(4,1,531) = 7.91, p < 0.001, partial eta-squared = 0.020). There is no signiﬁcant effect of the type of agency trust,
although there is an interaction effect present (F(8,1,531) = 1.97, p = 0.046). This indicates that the effect of trans-
parency is different between agencies, and therefore, we will carry out subsequent analysis to look at the effects of
© 2019 The Authors. Regulation & Governance Published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd 9
Decision transparency and trust S. Grimmelikhuijsen et al.
transparency for each regulatory agency separately. First, since we did not formulate any speciﬁc predictions for
the type of agency, we depict the estimated marginal means for the full sample.
Figure 3 indicates positive signiﬁcant effects of the transparency treatments, compared to the control group.
Furthermore, all transparency treatments have similar effects on trust. Subsequent planned contrasts – see “Anal-
ysis” Section for an explanation – show that there is a signiﬁcant difference between the control group and the
transparency treatment groups (F(1,1,541) = 30.39, p < 0.001), but none for the second (rationale) contrast which
compared the rationale treatment group against the other treatment groups (F(1,1,541) = 0.363, p = 0.547). This
conﬁrms what Figure 3 visualized: a clear difference between transparency and control, yet none between the spe-
ciﬁc transparency treatments.
Since the ANOVA analysis showed an interaction effect between treatment and type of agency, we also calcu-
lated the estimated marginal means within each type of agency.
Figure 4 depicts the marginal means of the transparency treatments within the type of agency domain, and
shows some interesting diverging patterns across each agency. First, there are no signiﬁcant effects of the trans-
parency treatments for the Authority Financial Markets (Finance), although the estimates are all in the expected,
positive direction (F(4,507) = 1.70, p = 143). The overall signiﬁcant effect of the transparency treatment seems to
be mostly driven by the Education Inspectorate (F(4,507) = 6.02, p < 0.001) and Health Care Inspectorate
(F(4,517) = 4.19, p = 0.002). Transparency in the health care domain brings out similar effects as found in the
general analysis: an overall effect of transparency, yet little differentiation between various transparency types.
However, in the domain of education, there does seem to be more differentiation between the various transpar-
ency treatments. When we use the planned contrast for rationale transparency – thus comparing the rationale
Table 2 ANOVA results of transparency and domain on trust in agency
df F p partial η2
Transparency 4 7.91 <0.001 0.020
Type of agency 2 2.43 0.088 0.003
Transparency × type of agency 8 1.97 0.046 0.010
Residuals 1,531
Figure 2 Change of decision acceptance in pretest (agency decides to postpone sanction) and post-test (agency decides to
execute sanction). Estimated marginal means and conﬁdence intervals (95%) are depicted.
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group with the other transparency treatments – we indeed ﬁnd that rationale transparency results in signiﬁcantly
higher levels of trust than the other transparency groups (F(1,507) = 5.89, p = 0.016).
Overall, for all three regulators combined, the Transparency Hypothesis is supported by the data: decision
information will lead to more citizen trust in a regulatory agency. Interestingly, we found no effect for one of the
three regulatory agencies, namely the AFM. Furthermore, in the general analysis, we found no substantive differ-
ences between the transparency treatments, which refutes the Rationale Transparency Hypothesis. However, in
Figure 3 Estimated Marginal Means for full sample. X-axis displays estimated marginal means for trust in a regulatory
agency. Conﬁdence intervals estimated at 95%.
Figure 4 Estimated Marginal Means split by domain. X-axis displays estimated marginal means for trust in a regulatory
agency. Conﬁdence intervals estimated at 95%.
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the domain of education, we do ﬁnd evidence for a distinctly stronger effect of rationale transparency. Interest-
ingly, the ﬁnal decision (the sanction) of the agency in this domain received signiﬁcantly less agreement among
participants (see Fig. 1). Also, participants perceived the decision of the Education Inspectorate to be signiﬁcantly
more difﬁcult than the decision of the Finance and Health Inspectorates (F(2,1,233) = 6.85, p = 0.001, Mﬁnance
= 3.42, Mhealthcare = 3.46, and Meducation = 3.64).
4 We explore this ﬁnding further in the “Discussion” section.
7. Discussion
To the best of our knowledge, this study represents the ﬁrst empirical research into the consequences of decision
transparency on citizen trust in regulatory agencies. Overall, our ﬁndings suggest that transparency about regula-
tory decisions can increase citizen trust in a regulatory agency, but that magnitude of the effect is moderated by
characteristics that are speciﬁc to the regulatory domain.
First, our study indicates that transparency of regulatory enforcement decisions positively inﬂuences public trust
in a regulator, supporting the Transparency Hypothesis. The support for the Transparency Hypothesis suggests that
the psychological distance may be an important psychological mechanism behind the effect of transparency. We
expected that providing decision transparency – of any kind – to trigger different evaluation criteria: concrete con-
siderations about how a regulatory agency makes decisions instead of abstract considerations invoking broad stereo-
types about what a regulatory agency does (cf. Idson & Mischel 2001; Smith & Trope 2006; Trope & Liberman
2010). At the same time, we discovered a limit to this effect, as we did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect of transparency
for the ﬁnancial regulator. Perhaps, it is harder to decrease the psychological distance for regulatory agencies in a
more abstract and technical domain such as ﬁnance. Therefore, we recommend to more speciﬁcally test this prom-
ising theory to explain trust in regulatory agencies and public organizations more broadly.
Second, we found limited support for the Rationale Transparency Hypothesis. We will elaborate on this by dis-
cussing a potential shortcoming of our experimental design and next by offering a substantive reﬂection of this
ﬁnding. We found that rationale transparency did have a distinct effect on trust in the Education Inspectorate, yet
such an effect was absent for the other agencies. One explanation for the lack of ﬁndings is that the experimental
vignettes in the ﬁnance and health care domain did not trigger motivated scepticism among participants. This lack
of scepticism might have led them to not care too much about the explanation of a decision (cf. Ditto & Lopez
1992). Indeed, most people already agreed with sanctioning an offender in the ﬁnancial or health care domain.
Hence, the decisions in these vignettes may not have been pronounced or controversial enough to motivate respon-
dents to scrutinize the decision explanations more precisely. On the other hand, the decision to impose a high ﬁne
to a school was perceived as less acceptable and thus motivated more participants to more closely scrutinize the
vignette. Eventually, this led to higher trust ratings when a decision’s rationale was explained. Although this may be
seen as a shortcoming in the design of the experiment – we should have designed vignettes with more controversial
decisions in the ﬁnancial and health care domain – this, too, yields substantive implications.
Indeed, as the vignettes were very similar across domains in terms of wording, structure and type of enforce-
ment decision, our results indicate that something in the nature of a regulatory domain may affect the overall inﬂu-
ence of decision transparency on citizen trust. For instance, citizens may be less patient with agencies that supervise
private markets, such as ﬁnancial services, than agencies that supervise a public domain, such as public schools.
The nature of a decision when intervening in a private market is perhaps perceived to be less of a tradeoff and
therefore people expect a tougher stance with heavy sanctions, instead of patience and forbearance. In contrast, edu-
cation – in the Netherlands, at least – is typically a public domain; schools service a public interest and decisions in
such public domain are more likely to touch upon politicized issues about equity and (in)justice. For instance, in
our vignette the decision of the Education Inspectorate concerned pupil equality in education. Indeed, our data sup-
port this assertion as participants agreed much less with imposing a sanction to a school than to a nursery home or
lender. Even more telling is that respondents perceived the decision of the Education Inspectorate as signiﬁcantly
more difﬁcult compared with the decision of the Authority Financial Markets and the Health Care Inspectorate.
Another way of thinking about the difference we found between the ﬁnancial regulator and the two inspector-
ates is their relative distance to ordinary citizens. The nature of the ﬁnancial regulator’s decisions is less related to
the day-to-day problems of ordinary citizens than, for instance, the health and education inspectorate. These
inspectorates are more in touch with citizen subjects, such as parents and patients, whereas regulatory agencies
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like the ﬁnancial regulator are more in contact with professional stakeholders instead of ordinary citizens. Hence,
being more aware of the ﬁnancial regulator’s decision might be less relevant for citizens.
Our ﬁndings provide fresh insights to the broader debate on regulatory enforcement styles and citizens perceptions
of these styles. Although literature indicates that low public trust can lead to strict “by the book” enforcement (Vogel
1986; Bardach & Kagan 2002), the reverse effect of enforcement style on public trust, has hardly been considered in
the literature. We ﬁnd that more lenient styles are tolerated to a greater extent when it truly concerns a devilish
dilemma about two equally important stakes, such as in the case of public schools violating norms about pupil equity.
Being transparent about why a certain – lenient – approach was taken may be help to foster trust in how a regulatory
agency handles difﬁcult tradeoffs and why it sometimes decides to postpone sanctioning (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992).
Our ﬁnding that the nature of a regulatory domain may moderate the effect of speciﬁc transparency types is also
important for the transparency literature. One central issue in this literature is uncovering the contextual conditions
that moderate the effects of transparency on trust (Cucciniello et al. 2017). We empirically show that the regulatory
context indeed affects the effect of regulatory transparency on public trust. This partly resonates with experimental
ﬁndings by the Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer (2014); see also De Fine Licht et al. 2014) who found that transparency
in more contested policy areas has more pronounced negative effects on decision support and that rationale transpar-
ency works better than process-based transparency. In contrast, our ﬁndings show that especially a more contested
decision tradeoff (i.e. education) rationale transparency has the most pronounced positive effect.
More broadly, an important implication of this ﬁnding is that transparency may be more effective as a trust-
generating mechanism for organizations that are placed at arm’s length from direct government and political
control, such as regulatory agencies. Generally, it is though that people do not like political decisionmaking and
being exposed to politicized decisionmaking and bargaining decreases trust (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2001;
Porumbescu et al. 2017). Conversely, transparency in less-politicized organizations could have a relatively positive
effect on trust and could even generate trust for some controversial decisions.
8. Conclusion
Overall, the most important contribution of this article is that we found evidence that decision transparency in gen-
eral has a positive effect on citizen trust in regulatory agencies. That being said, the effect of transparency is not
unambiguously positive as our results indicate that the nature of the regulatory domain attenuates or strengthens
the effect of decision transparency. Still the positive effects we found in the regulatory domain are in contrast with
some of the more negative ﬁndings from other, more inherently political domains (e.g. De Fine Licht 2011;
Porumbescu 2015; Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2017). We may need to rethink these more critical lines and more sys-
tematically test contextual elements where decision transparency increases trust, and where it does not.
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Endnotes
1 This is similar to the concept of accountability when it is understood as a relational concept in which an agency “renders
account” of its decisions to an external forum. Rendering account, then, can be understood as informing, explaining and
justifying one’s actions (Bovens 2007), which can be used by regulatory agencies to construct and sustain their legitimacy
(Black 2008). The difference between transparency and accountability is debated and not always straightforward, yet most
commonly they might be conceptualized as “matching parts” (see, for instance, Hood 2010). For instance, transparency
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does not necessarily require a clearly deﬁned account or, but releasing information that justiﬁes regulatory decisions does
play an important role in an accountability relation between an actor and a forum (Bovens 2007; Black 2008).
2 We thank one of the reviewers for pointing out this interesting example.
3 The complete experimental materials and questionnaire can be found in the Appendix S1.
4 We asked participants to what extent they agreed with the following item: “the regulatory agency had to consider a difﬁ-
cult trade-off between the interests of the organization on the one hand and the interests of citizens on the other hand.”
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